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by a skilled merchant or by one upon whom reliance is placed, leads the
writer to believe that the sale of a used house is properly governed by the
doctrine of caveat emptor.100
An application of the existing law of implied warranties produces an
anomalous result in the "model home" situation. The purchaser of a com-
pleted new home is without a remedy for defects in the absence of an express
contractual provision, express warranty or fraud, yet his neighbor who buys
a similar home before it is completed receives the benefit of implied war-
ranties of proper workmanship and fitness for habitation.
Today's consumer of a new product, in general, buys with assurance that
the law imposes some duty on the vendor in the form of an implied war-
ranty as to quality,10 ' and many builders voluntarily recognize such a duty
in the sale of a new house in regard to the repair of defects. To protect the
purchaser of a defective house from an irresponsible builder it is submitted
that in the sale of every new house the law should recognize an implied
warranty as to proper workmanship and materials and fitness for intended
habitation. 10 2
EUGENE I. SE .KER
The Consequences of Discriminatory
Union Membership Policy
THE CONTINUING push for union organization and union security
has pointed up the need for reconciling such objectives with the rights of
individuals. The rights and duties discussed here concern only one facet
of this large problem. What rights has an individual, and what duties does
a labor union owe toward an individual, who is arbitrarily refused full mem-
1
"' Unless the skill of a real estate agent is to be attributed to the seller, thus making
him a skilled merchant, the analogy to the sale of second-hand goods is inescapable
and offers a further basis for restricting implied warranty to new houses. Dunham,
Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, PROCEEDINGS,
AmIuCAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION oF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRusT
LAw 16 (1952).
101 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15.
.. See Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PRO-
BATE AND TRUST LAw 4 (1952) as to current developments along this line. In
England, the destruction of caveat emptor is indicated by a statute which changed
the common law by imposing an implied warranty of fitness for habitation in the
lease of every house rented below a designated price. Housing Act, 1936, 26 Geo.
5 and 1 Edw. 8, c. 51.
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bership rights in a union? Although the most simple and thorough solution
would be to admit such persons to membership, the courts have shown little
desire to do so without legislative prodding.1 Therefore, the problems dis-
cussed within the framework of this note will be concerned only with the
duties of unions to such non-members short of granting them the right to
join a union.
Du= To REPsENT FAnLY
Both the National Labor Relations Act 2 and the Railway Labor Acte
provide in effect that the bargaining representative chosen by a majority
of workers in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representative of
all within the unit or class. Nowhere in either act is it expressly stated that,
because this bargaining unit is an exclusive one, the chosen representative
must treat all whom it represents in an equal and non-discriminatory man-
ner. This proposition, however, was established in the case of Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R.4 The plaintiff in that case was a fireman for
the defendant railroad and was barred because of his race from membership
in the defendant Brotherhood of Railway Firemen. The Brotherhood, as
the bargaining representative of the firemen, negotiated a contract with
the railroad providing that not more than 50% of the firemen in each class
of service in each seniority district should be Negroes and that all vacancies
should be filled by white men. As a result, the plaintiff lost his seniority
rights and was relegated to less remunerative work. The plaintiff brought
suit but was held to have no right to complain of the union's action.5
The Supreme Court reversed this decision. The rule enunciated was
based on a reading of the statute which implied that Congress, in providing
that the majority representative should have the power to bargain for all
'For an excellent discussion of statutory aspects of the general problem see Aaron
and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. REV. 425,
631 (1949). Legislative innovations have largely consisted of Labor Commissions
or Fair Employment Commissions empowered to enforce a right to membership in
a union. Oregon is an example of the former and Connecticut of the latter. Fletcher
v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, 4 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 49,176 (Ore. 1952);
Connecticut Comm'n on Civil Rights ex rel. Tilley v. International Brotherhood of
Elec. Workers, 4 CCH LAB. LAW REP. 49,170 (Conn. 1952).
'49 STAT. 453 as amended (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
'44 STAT. 577 as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152, fourth.
'323 U.S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226 (1944). Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 Sup. Ct. 235 (1944) was decided as a
companion case.
'Steele v. Louisville & N.R.L, 245 Ala. 113, 16 So.2d 416 (1944). The Alabama
court was relying on the general rule that in general seniority rights are a creature
of the union and thus subject to destruction by the union. Shaup v. Grand Int'l
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Long
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 155 Md. 265, 141 Ad. 504 (1928).
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within the class, did not intend a union to have the unlimited power to de-
stroy rights. The Court stated:
The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organiza-
tion chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority
as well as the minority, and is to act for and not against those whom it
represents.'
Although concurring in the result, one member of the Court placed his
decision on the ground that the statute as applied to this plaintiff was un-
constitutional,1 a question which the majority expressly avoided deciding.8
However, despite the Court's disagreement as to the correct ground upon
which to base the decision, its effect is dear. Henceforth, a union as exclu-
sive bargaining agent can be prevented from discriminating in its contract
negotiations against non-members whom it represents."
Subsequent to the decision in the Steele case, the lower federal courts
were presented with contract provisions that were merely subterfuges to
circumvent this duty of fair representation." In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Engiveers,1 an injunction was granted to re-
strain enforcement of a contract providing that only "promotable" men
would be employed as firemen. There was an express clause in the contract
to the effect that "non-promotable" should refer only to Negroes. The
omission 'of such an express clause did not prevent another court from
looking past the labels in a later case.1 2 The latter court, in rejecting the
'Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 197, 65 Sup. Ct. 226, 230 (1944).
"Id. at 202, 65 Sup. Ct. at 232.
'Although the above quoted interpretation of the statute was adopted as the ground
for its holding, the Court also stated: "If, as the state court has held, the Act con-
fers this power on the bargaining representative ... constitutional questions arise.
If the Railway Labor Act purports to impose on petitioner ... the legal duty to com-
ply with the terms of a contract, whereby the representative has discriminatorily re-
stricted their employment for the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood's own
members we must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner raises in his
pleading. But we think that Congress . . . did not intend to confer plenary power
upon the union ... without imposing on it any duty to protect the minority which
it represents." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198, 65 Sup. Ct. 226,
230 (1944).
'Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 70
Sup. Ct. 14 (1949) illustrates this fact. The Court in that case turned down the
argument that such discrimination was valid because a majority of the union mem-
bers had voted for it.
" "From the formation of its organization in 1873 down to the present time the
Brotherhood has been committed to a program of eliminating Negro locomotive
firemen from railroad service and replacing them with white firemen, members or
potential members of the Brotherhood." Letter from the Brotherhood to the Louis-
ville & N.R.R. reproduced in Hall v. Louisville & N.R.R., 18 CCH LAB. CAS. IF
65,916 (D.C. Ky. 1950).
' 163 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1947).
' Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line RL.R, 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
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argument that the contract provision was based on efficiency as to which
the Brotherhood had a large discretion, pointed out that a discrimination
based on a legal classification, which in turn was based on race, would not
be tolerated.1V 3
NATuRE OF UNFAIR REPRESENTATION
1. Th Problem of Auxiliary Unions
The Supreme Court in the Steele case specifically held that the statute,
as interpreted, did not deny labor unions the right to determine eligibility
to membership.14 This negatived any implication that merely excluding
a person from membership in the union would of itself violate the duty to
represent fairly.
The question then arises, what if under a proper union security clauser,
full membership is denied, but membership in an auxiliary union is offered
or even insisted upon? The first case arising under the recently amended""
Railway Labor Act, Taylor v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,'
decided that segregation per se is not unlawful. The same rule had been
applied to cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act.i s The rea-
son for such a rule is found in the fact that an opposite holding would re-
"The court relied on Richmond v. Dean, 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930) in which it
was held that a zoning ordinance which in effect discriminated on grounds of race
would.not be upheld merely because it was based on a legal prohibition of inter-
marriage, which itself was based on racial grounds.
" Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 206, 65 Sup. Ct 226, 232 (1944).
The two most common forms of union security are the dosed shop and the union
shop. The former requires a worker to be a member of the union before he can
start working. The latter requires the worker to become a member of the union at
some stated period after the employment relationship has begun, usually thirty days.
A variation that was popular during the war was to give workers already in the un-
ion a chance to drop their membership only at stated intervals. This form of se-
curity i s referred to as "maintenance of membership." ROTHENBERG, LABOR RELA-
Tiols 48 (1949).
" The Railway Labor Act, which previously did not allow any form of union security
clause, has been amended to provide for a union shop. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152, eleventh (a).
" 106 F. Supp. 438 (D.C 1952).
"'Segregation of white employees and Negro employees into separate locals is not
per se a form of racial discrimination. Where the union represents that it does not,
never has and never will discriminate against any race or creed and will provide equal
representation to the colored as well as to the white locals, such representation is
construed to mean that the local composed of Negroes is now and will continue to
be, accorded the same rights of affiliation and representation as is accorded to other
affiliated locals." Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L1..B. 973, 975 (1945). That
the present rule is as unsatisfactory in the labor field as it is in education or trans-
portation is indicated by the number of suits brought asking for full membership
rights.
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sult in enforcement of a right to membership in the bargaining union. To
avoid such a result, the court in the Taylor case takes pains to point out that
the legislative history of the amendment shows no Congressional intent to
alter membership rights.19
2. Extension of the Rule in the Steele case
As was seen, definite limits have been placed on the ability of unions to
discriminate against minority groups whom they represent. But even after
the decision in the Steele case, the railway brotherhoods never considered
that they owed a legal duty toward persons not within the class for which
the union acted as bargaining representative.2" Thus a familiar tactic of the
brotherhoods is to demand that work assignable to Negroes not in the craft
represented by the brotherhood be given to those whom the brotherhood
represents and who are capable of doing the same work. This device was
struck down in the recent case of Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v.
Howard.2 1
In the Howard case the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen was the bar-
gaining representative for white "brakemen." Negroes, ineligible for mem-
bership in the Brotherhood, had for years held the position known as "train
porter" and were represented by a bargaining agent of their own choosing.
Although the crafts were separate in name, the "train porters" performed
all the duties of brakemen and were recognized as brakemen for a brief
"Taylor v. Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks, 106 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.C.
1952). It should be noted that the amendment to the- Railway Labor Act has no
proviso to the effect that nothing contained in the Act shall impair the right of
unions to determine eligibility to membership, although such a proviso appears in
the Labor-Management Act of 1947. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (1) (A). In the face of this difference between the Acts the court in the
Taylor case relied on the statement in the Steele case that the Railway Labor Act did
not impair the right of a union to determine eligibility to its membership. Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 65 Sup. Ct. 226, 233. Since the Railway
Labor Act omits such an express proviso it would seem that the power of a union
is less under that Act.
'The complex administrative scheme set up by the Railway Labor Act would seem
to justify the brotherhoods' conclusion, at least in part. Under that Act disputes as
to who are the proper representatives of a carrier's employees are referred to the
National Mediation Board. 44 STAT. 577 as amended (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152,
ninth (1946). Jurisdictional disputes between unions are referred to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board. 44 STAT. 578 as amended (1943), 45 U.S.C. § 153
et seq. (1946). The Supreme Court has held that one aggrieved by the action of a
union must first exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Act. Slo-
cum v. Delaware L & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 70 Sup. Ct. 577 (1950); Order of
Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66 Sup. Ct. 322 (1946); General
Comm. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 320 U.S. 323, 64 Sup. Ct. 146
(1943). As regards Negroes the Court has evidently carved out an exception to
this rule. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 Sup. Ct.
1022, (1952).
' 343 U.S. 768, 72 Sup. Cr. 1022 (1952).
[Summer
NOTES
period during World War I when the government took over the railroads.
In an attempt to provide more work for its members, the Brotherhood
under threat of a strike forced the railroad to agree to discharge the Negro
"porters" and fill their jobs with white men. The plaintiff, Howard, on be-
half of himself and others similarly situated, brought an action against the
Brotherhood and the railroad for a decree that the contract provision be
declared void and unenforceable. The district court held the issue non-
justiciable because the plaintiffs administrative remedies had not been ex-,
hausted.2 2 The court of appeals held that the "train porters" were actually
brakemen and, therefore, protected under the rule laid down in the Steele
case.28
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. In answering the
argument that the Brotherhood owed no duty whatsoever to refrain from
using its statutory bargaining power to abolish the jobs of the Negro "train
porters," the Court held that:
The Federal Act prohibits agents it authorizes from using their posi-
tion and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order to bestow them
on white workers2'
The holding, according to the opinion, is based on a similar interpreta-
tion of the statute to that invoked in the Steele case.25 However, the broad
language quoted above would seem to indicate that the Court will allow an
injunction against any discrimination by a union bargaining under the Rail-
way Labor Act. The only correct theory on which to base such a holding is
that the union, at least for purposes of preventing racial discrimination, is an
organ of the government since, in the absence of a Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act, a private unincorporated association is not prohibited from dis-
criminating against anyone.2 6 The reasoning of the majority, as a conse-
quence, is unsatisfactory and obscure, for the Supreme Court does not make
'Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
'Howard v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 191 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1951).
'Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774, 72 Sup. Ct.
1022, 1025 (1952).
'Id. at 773, 72 Sup. Ct. at 1025.
"The dissent dearly points up this difficulty: "I do ont understand that private
parties such as the carrier and the Brotherhood may not discriminate on the ground
of race. Neither a state government nor the Federal Government may do so, but I
know of no applicable federal law which says that private parties may not." Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 778, 72 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1027
(1952). It should be noted that one state court has held that union action was
government action, and, therefore, under the Fifth Amendment the union must
allow the plaintiffs full participation rights. In that case, however, there had been
a prior promise to allow full membership. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169
P.2d 831 (1946). The decision has been mentioned but not followed in any other
state.
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its real holding dear. Are all unions henceforth required to regard the
rights of workers whom they do not represent as a governmental body must
regard the rights of its citizens? Or was the Court merely affirming the
court of appeals by holding that, in effect, the train porters were brakemen
and therefore must be protected under the rule of the Steele case."
That the probable effect of the Howard case will be to widen the duty
of non-discrimination to include employees who are without the bargaining
unit is admirably brought out in Dillard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.28 The
plaintiffs in that case were Negro laborers. The defendant Brotherhood
sought to prevent the promotion of the laborers into the craft which the
Brotherhood represented. Relying specifically on the Howard case, the
court held that the union had abused its statutory power by attempting to
deny the plaintiff's promotion into the higher class. Because it is dear that
the plaintiffs in the Dillard case were not within the class protected under
the Railway Labor Act as construed by the Supreme Court in the Steele case,
it would seem the court regarded the Howard case as deciding that a union
is constitutionally prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race.
UNION SECURITY CLAUSES AND CLOSED MEMBERSHIP
Both the closed and union shop29 were permissible for unions bargain-
ing under the National Labor Relations Act; however, the Labor-Manage-
ment Act of 1947 abolished the closed shop.30 In contrast, no union se-
curity clauses were permitted under the Railway Labor Act until 19511
When a union security clause is granted and the union arbitrarily refuses
membership to an individual, a serious question of discrimination arises.
In this situation the union, by its refusal of membership alone, is threatening
the employment of the individual discriminated against 2
'Again the dissent points out the logical inconsistency of the majority opinion:
"The majority does not say that the train porters are brakemen and therefore the
Brotherhood must represent them fairly as was held in the Steele case. Whether they
belong to the Brotherhood is not determinative of the latter's duties of representation
if it represents the craft of brakemen and if the train porters are brakemen. Steele was
not a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen and could
not be because of race-the same reason that the train porters cannot belong to
the Brotherhood of Trainmen. But Steele was a fireman, while the train porters
are not brakemen." 343 U.S. 768, 776, 72 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1027 (1952).
199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
'See note 15 supra.
n61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3).
'See note 16 supra.
'
3 This power is to be contrasted with that of a union unable to gain a security clause.
In such a case the union may only attempt to discriminate (which attempt would
under present law be unsuccessful), but under no circumstances would it have the
right to effect the discharge of a non-member. This was the situation of the rail-
way brotherhoods before 1951.
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1. Right to Retain Employment
A union protected by a security clause generally has the right to effect
the discharge of employees who refuse to become members of the union.
In logic, perhaps, the result should be the same when the union refuses
membership. However, the courts have protected employees who are re-
fused membership in a union having a dosed shop or union shop agreement
by enjoining the union from interfering with the employment of a non-
member, so long as the membership is refused on racial or other arbitrary
grounds.3 3 Despite a tendency to cling to the historical rule that a union
will not be required to take in an individual as a member,34 courts of equity
will usually protect the employee by recognizing his right to continue in a
present employment 5
The case of Seligman v. Toledo Moving Pictures Operators Union8 il-
lustrates the rule clearly. The plaintiff was a motion picture operator who
had worked in and around Toledo with permission from the union which
had a dosed shop agreement with the motion picture theaters in the area.
' James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Lucke v. Cloth-
ing & Trimmers' Assembly, 77 Md. 376, 26 At. 505 (1893); Wilson v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverer's Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Ad. 720 (1938); Dorrington v.
Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A.2d 886 (1938); accord, Wills v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 435 (1927); Schwab v. Moving Pic-
ture Operators Union, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941). Contra: Walter v.
McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677 (1941). The Restatement of Torts has
adopted the rule. "Workers who in concert procure the dismissal of an employee
because he is not a member of a labor union satisfactory to the workers are ...
liable to the employee if, but only if, he desires to be a member of the labor union
but membership is not open to him on reasonable terms." RESTATEmENT, TORTS
§ 801 (1939).
"Mayer v. Journeyman's Stone-Cutters Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 At. 493 (1890)
is the leading case. For discussion of the right to join a union, see Hewitt, The
Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 919 (1951); Sum-
mers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L REv. 33 (1947); Summers, Admission
Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. EcON. 66 (1946).
' Before 1947 the relief granted in such a case came largely from the state rather
than the federal courts because prior to 1947 the National Labor Relations Act did
not contain provisions for union unfair labor practices, but only for employer unfair
labor practices. Since many cases involved only the union's action without any
culpability on the part of the employer, a federal court would not have had juris-
diction to entertain such a case. The cases that were litigated in Federal courts arose
under the duty of fair representation established in the Steele case. E.g., Wallace
Corp. v. N.LR.B., 323 U.S. 248, 65 Sup. Ct 682 (1944). Although without
specific jurisdiction to curb discriminatory practices by unions, the NLRB, before
1947, stated: ".... if it is shown by appropriate motion that the union has denied
equal representation to any employee because of his race, creed or national origin we
will consider rescinding any certification which may be issued herein." Carter Mfg.
Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804, 806 (1944). The decertification rule also applies where the
union seeks a non-member's discharge. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53
N.LR.B. 999 (1943).
" 88 Ohio App. 137, 98 N.E.2d 54 (1947).
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Eventually this permission was withdrawn, and the union demanded that
the plaintiff's employer discharge him in accordance with the dosed shop
agreement because he was not a member of the union. The court of ap-
peals affirmed an order for injunctive relief, saying that as a matter of pub-
lic policy the union could not simultaneously demand a dosed shop and
refuse membership to a man already employed and fully qualified to do the
job.3 7 The holding is in accord with the decisions of most courts that have
considered the question. 8 Although the cases are limited for the most part,
some courts have taken the position that the union must either stop inter-
fering with the plaintiff's employment or admit him to membership. 9 On
the other hand, at least one state is committed to the proposition that such
relief will be granted only where it is shown that the union has a monopoly
of the labor supply in the community. °
2. Statutory Lidtation of Union Security to a Union Shop
Recognizing the wisdom of curbing a union's power to effect the dis-
charge of an employee by an arbitrary refusal of membership, Congress
codified the rule established by the courts. The Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 provides:
That no employer shall justify any discrimination (A) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that... membership was not available
to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender ... dues ... and.... initiation fees...."
and:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents... (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against and employee... with respect to whom membership in such or-
ganization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender.., dues.., and ... initiation fees...
Since the union shop is the only permitted form of union security under
the 1947 Act, the above statutory provisions act as an effective guarantee
that a worker will be protected in his right to acquire a job and keep it.43
"Id. at 146, 98 N.E.2d at 59.
3 See note 33 supra.
"James v. Mariaship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
"Carroll v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d
223 (1943). California is the only state that has expressly declared that monopoly
of the labor supply in a community is not necessary. William v. International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal.2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) (a closed shop
in one plant is a sufficient monopoly).
" 49 STAT. 452 (1935) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3).
"49 STAT. 452 (1935) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2).
"Because only the union shop is permitted to unions bargaining under the National
[Slimmer
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3. The Right to Obtain Work
Does a worker seeking employment, as distinguished from one already
employed, have a right against a union which arbitrarily refuses him mem-
bership and thus blocks his entry to a job where membership is a condition
precedent to employment?
Although the dosed shop is prohibited to unions bargaining under the
aegis of the National Labor Relations Act, at least twenty-two states still
regard the dosed shop as a legitimate union objective." It has been held
recently that a union which is able to bargain without the benefit of the
National Labor Relations Board machinery is not subject to the sanctions
of the Act even though the union is in interstate commerce4 5 Moreover, it
is well to keep in mind that the dosed shop has historically been the most
coveted goal of organized labor. It has been fought for in the face of the
threat of the'doctrine of criminal conspiracy" and even in the face of the
present national legislation 7 Thus the problem of what duty is owed a
worker who is refused membership in a union and who, therefore, cannot
obtain employment because of the requirement that he be a member of that
union is still one of crucial importance.48
Obviously the need for such'protection is as imperative as the rule
which protects a worker already employed. In certain industries, such as
construction and shipbuilding, any one period of employment is likely to
be extremely short-lived. If a man has a reasonable chance to get a job, no
union should be able to prevent him from doing so by arbitrarily dosing
its books to him and still demand that the employer live up to the closed
shop agreement.
One writer is of the opinion that:
In spite of the limited holdings on the facts of the cases there is some
reason to believe that most courts would grant equal protection to the right
to get a job!'
Labor Relations Act, a worker can get a job, but may have to join the union later
on. Once employed the union cannot effect his discharge by refusing him member-
ship so long as he tenders initiation fees and dues.
"Some of the more industrial states are included. California, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon are among
them. E.g., lacomini's Restaurant v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Local, 107 N..2d 413 (Ohio App. 1949). For a comprehensive listing see the
chart in 4CCH LAB. LAW REP. F 40,355 (1952).
'Williams v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, 103 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
" Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
"American Newspaper Publishers Assn v. NLRB, 193 F. 2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951).
"See Jansen, The Closed Shop is Not a Closed Issue, 2 IND. & LABOR REL. Rv.
546 (1949).
" Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REv. 33, 47 (1947).
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It appears, however, that the modern cases which have considered this ques-
tion, of which there are few, have concluded that the union owes no duty
to a non-member who seeks employment.50 A lower federal court in dis-
cussing the problem said:
There is... no authority for the idea that the union has any... duty
toward persons not employed but who are employable. . . The duty
found... in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co. was one of fair representation.
... The Wallace case does not hold that the union has any duty to consider
the plight of a person who is deprived of securing employment because of
the union shop [dosed shop?] closed membership combination 1
It is interesting to speculate as to what effect the Howard case will have
on the right to obtain employment. Before that case it seemed apparent
that the right to obtain work would have to be based on some principle
other than the right to fair representation because that principle was thought
to apply only to those already within the bargaining unit12 As noted above,
the only decision in point since Brotherhood of Railway Trainmean v. How-
ard interpreted the Howard case as deciding that unions can be prevented
from using their power to discriminate in employment relations regardless
of whether the persons sought to be discriminated against are within the
class represented by the bargaining agent. 3  If the interpretation of the
rule laid down in the Howard case is correct, whether the basis of the rule
be constitutional or statutory, a union is charged with the same obligation
to one seeking employment as to one already employed.5'
CONCLUSION
Summing up the law as it stands today, two propositions are clear: first,
an employee represented by a union which denies him membership has the
right to equal and fair representation by that union along with those who
are members; second, such an employee has a well-established right to re-
main undisturbed in his employment. A logical corollary to this last propo-
sition would be that an employee will be protected in his right to obtain
employment. This right has never been granted in any case, but that it
'Underwood v. Texas & P. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); cf. Hester v.
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 99 F. Supp. 968 (Mo. 1951); See Comment,
49 YALE L.J. 754, 759.
Courant v. International Photographers of Motion Picture Industry, 176 F.2d 1000,
1003 (9th Cir. 1949).
" Ibid. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 235 (1944).
'Dillard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
'Note, by way of analogy, that the Supreme Court and the NLRB both agree that
refusal to hire a worker because of union affiliation is as much an unfair labor prac-
tice as discharging an employee for the same reason. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941); T.H. Burns,& R.H. Gillespie, 101 N.L.R.B.
No. 187 (1952).
[Slimmer
